En múltiples entradas del blog hemos hablado de buenas y malas experiencias en proyectos ferroviarios. Siguiendo esa linea el caso de Turquía es interesante, como España han realizado múltiple proyectos de transporte ferroviario, principalmente tranviarios aunque también de alta velocidad hoy en día, con muchas empresas españolas involucradas.
El análisis realizado en este articulo compara los proyectos realizados en varias ciudades de Turquía (Estambul, Ankara, Izmir y Bursa) entre 1992 y 2001. Para evaluar los proyectos comparan los resultados obtenidos y los previstos en todos los casos y las causas de las desviaciones, tanto con los responsables de ejecución como los promotores de los proyectos.
La primera conclusión que obtienen los autores es la siguiente. “As the primary indicators of performance, cost and ridership forecast and outcome data are collected and considered in the comparison. It is found that systems performed rather poor in terms of expectations, such as attaining ridership forecasts, being built within budget etc. Hence there is a gap between expectations and outcomes If a rail system has a considerably high ridership, this is a proof that it is built on a high-demand corridor and that it is attracting passengers, thus fulfilling the expectations from the investment. Therefore, ridership, which is the number of passengers carried (annually or daily), is generally considered as the indicative of a rail system’s success. When systems are planned, they are expected to reach a certain level of ridership, which is used to justify the high-cost investment. Therefore, a reasonable level of ridership is in fact a primary expectation from urban rail investment. “
Una de las referencias que se cite como ejemplo de que estas desviaciones entre previsiones y resultados son muy grandes es el de “Kain (1988) criticized building light rail lines in low density Sunbelt cities like Los Angeles and Dallas. He claimed that both in Dallas and Los Angeles the decisions to build LRT systems was an outcome of a more emotional and psychological attachment to rail rather than an outcome of a cost-effective analysis and/or another method of forecasting. The decisions were made without any consideration of any other alternative such as a bus rapid transit system which would be more suitable. The proposed ridership forecasts were far too high and it is understood that the advocates of rail systems have shown a tendency to overestimate the ridership forecasts.” Dicho en un lenguaje mas llano y accesible, los proyectos se hicieron porque querían tener ferrocarril no por ser la conclusión de un estudio de movilidad objetivo. (a quien no le gusta un monorail??).
En el caso de Turquía el problema es el mismo ” Özalá (2007) also claimed that in many cases the decision to build a rail system was already taken by politicians, without considering the land use plans, population size, topography, travel demand, etc. “
Como puede parecer lógico la forma de decidir que sistema de transporte se ha de construir o desarrollar depende principalmente de las estimaciones de demanda, existiendo soluciones adaptadas a todas las combinaciones de pasajeros y distancias. “When analyzing the rail systems in Turkey, it was observed in the interviews that one of the most important reasons for building these systems was related to the expected passenger demands on the selected corridors. In other words, planners expected high ridership levels in the selected corridors and justified the rail investment on the grounds that alternative technologies, such as bus systems, could not meet the demand. Therefore, it can be argued that attaining a certain level of ridership, i.e. the ridership that was forecasted, should be a primary criteria in assessing the performance of Turkish systems”
Si el análisis y las estimaciones de demanda son correctas, el sistema construido es el diseñado, la desviación entre la previsión y el resultado real ha de ser pequeña “Another universal way of assessing urban rail performance is to analyze the difference between ridership forecasts and the actual outcomes. It appears that in Turkey too, urban rail systems have a rather limited success in attaining the estimated ridership levels. In addition, similar to the arguments in the literature, the failure in attaining forecasts seems to be related with the failure in the implementation of various measures originally proposed in the planning phase. It can be suggested that in Turkey too there is over-optimism in the planning of urban rail systems.”
En general el efecto de construir nuevas infraestructuras de transporte publico es positivo, pero la mayoría de los modos de transporte alternativos desarrollados penalizan el crecimiento y el conseguir los resultados esperados “Public transport ridership increased after the opening of urban rail systems. It is seen that the introduction of the rail systems attracted more passengers to public transport in Ankara; however, the rate of growth seems to have decreased in the later years. This would be because of having private car oriented policies in the city. There are lots of road investments encouraging private car usage. Public transportation policies are ineffective as such that the integration between the systems are not maintained and minibuses and private taxis have the power to get passengers from the public transport lines. This reduces rail and bus transit usage in the city”
Citando el caso particular de Bursa, se puede ver el problema de falta de política de transportes municipal integrada “In Bursa, rail and bus transport were tried to be integrated but failed because of the minibuses and buses continued to operate in parallel lines, competing rather than complementing the system. It was seen in the previous section that public transport share in total transport modes is also low accordingly due to the mentioned problem. In 2006, the number of passengers carried by buses in the city tripled and it increased the passengers carried by public transport modes in Bursa. However, the passengers carried by Bursaray did not increase sharply as the passengers carried by bus modes. After the opening of Bursaray, the increase in the following years is an important finding, showing that Bursaray had a positive effect on the overall public transport usage in Bursa.”
En cuanto al cumplimiento de los costes estimados de construcción ” It was found that the Taksim-4th Levent Metro cost more than double the amount that was estimated (146% more than the estimation). The Izmir Light Metro system was also built for more than double the amount that it was estimated to cost (104% above the estimations). The Izmir metro project was also a turnkey project. However, underground tunnels resulted in additional costs. In the implementation of Bursaray, the cost was exceeded and therefore an additional budget of 55,000,000 Euros had to be created for section B. This is the actual reason why the construction was divided into two stages as A and B. Proposed amoun twas adequate just for the construction of the system from the west side of the city to the Sehrekustu station. After finding new financial resources the stage B was completed. The route of stage B was changed in this period because the compulsory purchase was high and the rail transit system was decided to be underground that increased the total costs “ Es decir, que el diseño de la red a realizar es “Tan grande como podamos pagar”
La única conclusion clara respect a los costes, en la linea con Flyvbjerg “As a result, with the exception of the systems in Ankara, the cost of building the urban rail systems exceeds the estimated budgets. “ y punto.
En general, los autores expresan una queja bastante clara con respecto al problema de selección de proyectos de transporte urbano. ” While such investment in rail systems may be justifiable in a number of cities in Turkey, there is also growing concern that in a majority of cities, plans to build rail transit do not rely on realistic predictions and technically sound studies. Öncü (2007), forexample, argued that in many cases, the technical properties of the systems, threats and benefits of the projects and the costs are and use plans, population size, topography, travel demand, etc. Gercek (2007) pointed out the fact that the decisions on transportation systems and urban land use principles are made almost with no technical research and that on the contrary the city authorities make decisions with an approach that Gercek summarized as ‘‘we know what is best for the city’’. Gercek (2007) also noted that the mayor of Greater Istanbul Municipality stated in a public meeting that politically, sometimes, decisions are given without considering the technical side of the projects. The Mayor further added that it is not an obligation to ask for the approval of the planning authority in order to implement the projects.” Y otra queja en cuanto al mal funcionamiento del proceso de gestión de carteras de proyectos, donde un gran proyecto de transporte se divide en varios paquetes complementarios que no se ejecutan todos y hace que la mayor parte de la inversión no sea tan eficaz como corresponde. “Because The interviews and the analysis revealed that the main reason for the failure to attain expectations was that many policies and measures, such as integration, combined tickets, pedestrian areas, etc., were not implemented although they were proposed during the planning of the systems. It is concluded that one aspect is common in each system: there is an over-optimism in planning while many elements of the plans, particularly complementary projects, are not successfully implemented.”
Tanto en Turquía como en todo el mundo los proyectos de transporte urbano o interurbano tienen los mismos problemas y las soluciones aunque no perfectas reducen mucho los efectos. El coste social de construir infraestructuras por motivos emocionales o por razones políticas es muy grande y no es una forma racional de invertir los recursos públicos. Hay buenas formas de hacerlo y ese es el camino de que debemos buscar a la hora de diseñar el sistema de transporte optimo en cualquier lugar.